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ENGLISH LAW AND LAWYERS
When the practice of the law in England happens to come under
the observation of an American lawyer the widely different customs and
peculiarities of practice are almost certain to make him feel that he is
dealing with a different system of law altogether instead of the old
common law which, as we have always been told, came from England.
But the reason for these customs and peculiarities is not hard to find.
There was a king in England in 400 B. C. when Ezra and Nehemiah were
building the walls of Jerusalem and Herodotus was wandering about in
Egypt collecting material for his history. Some of the laws of England
can be traced back to almost that date through the Saxon Conquest, the
Norman Conqucst, the Roman Conquest, through periods of Roman
Catholic domination and Protestant domination down to the present time.
One of these old laws is expressed in the earliest book in the phrase:
"The husbandrmen's plows shall have the privilege of sanctuary." if this
means anything it must mean that the tools with which a man makes his
living shall be exempt from execution. The earliest lawyers appear to
have been monks, who attended the hearings of ecclesiastical courts, listened to the decisions in each case, and advised the knights and yeomen
who came to them as to what would probably happen to them if their
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cases went to court. Those were the days of trials by church dignitaries, trials by ordeal, and trials by combat. The king's court moved
about with him wherever he went and causes were supposed to be decided by reference to some mystery or superstition. But somewhere in
the thirteenth century the monks were ordered to leave legal affairs
alone and a distinct class of lawyers spring up and with them a thin
but persisting and continuous system of deciding matters by some use
of reason and logic. These early lawyers lived together as a brotherhood
or guild and there must have been weighty discussions of law, wholly
unhampered by any principle of stare decisis in the inns of court, which
were really inns in those days. The fact that these early lawyers did
live together as a brotherhood is probably the explanation of the fact
that the common law persisted. For many attempts were made to
stamp it out and replace it by the civil law, or the Roman law. The
purpose seemed to be that the civil law was wholly in Latin and nobody
but the priests could read it. But after each attack the lawyers resumed their discussions of the English law and the civil law remained
on the continent. So, the common law grew and developed, always
changing but always retaining something of the earlier law through the
time of the Plantaganets and the Stuarts and the Tudors and the domination of the Catholic and Protestant religions for centuries. "The common law of England" as someone said, "became the reflection of the history of England." When these facts are recalled to us and compared
with the comparative brevity of our own legal history and we remember the peculiar tenacity of legal forms, we may fairly come to the conclusion that it would be rather surprising if the practice of the law of
England did not retain some forms and customs which remind us of the
middle ages and which would be very much out of place on this side of
the water.
Perhaps the most striking peculiarity of the English practice from an
American standpoint is the methodical and rigid division of the profession into two parts-barristers and solicitors. This division corresponds to our occasional informal divisions of lawyers into trial lawyers
and office lawyers, but that idea only partially expresses it, for the gulf
is enormously wider between a barrister and a solicitor. It begins with
their education and a student must decide at the beginning of his
course which he desires to be-barrister or solicitor. They attend different schools and pass examinations on different subjects. No one but
a solicitor may file a cause of action, or draw certain papers, or handle
ordinary office business. But when the case comes to trial no one but a
barrister may try it in any of the courts of any importance in the kingdom. At the trial the barrister sits in the front row of seats and the
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solicitor sits in the row behind him and hands him papers and makes
suggestions; but the voice of the solicitor is never heard except in chancery chambers, the bankruptcy court of first instance, and a few minor
tribunals. The judicial offices are open only to the barristers, while, on
the other hand, there are a great many proctorships and receiverships open
only to the solicitors. When a legal matter reaches the point of litigation the solicitor puts his client in touch with a barrister, but peculiar as
it may seem, the solicitor and the barrister, are not permitted to enter
into a partnership, and between these two classes of lawyers there is even
a social distinction. A solicitor may entertain a barrister, but if a barrister should begin to pay much attention socially to a solicitor, he would
be regarded as endeavoring to secure business on some other basis than
his professional record. One of the charges against the notorious Jeffreys was that he "drank desperately with the solicitors," the objection being not to his drinking desperately, but to his entertaining the solicitors
with too much enthusiasm. This social distinction between the two different branches does not seem to spring so much from a feeling that
one class is better than the other as from the typical English desire that
every man shall have an exact and more or less rigid definition of his
business and his position.
The barrister is not an officer of the court. No court admits him to
practice nor has any power to disbar him from his profession. The inns
of court from which a barrister graduates, choose among their number
who have been in the practice for more than ten years, a group called
the "benchers" who admit barristers to bar, discipline them for infractions of professional ethics, and, if need be, disbar them. Nobody knows
who gave the inns of court this power. There is no record of any court
or any king or any Parliament ever granting such a power, but the inns
of court have it and exercise it today. If a trial judge should become
acquainted with actions on the part of the barrister which called for a
disbarment proceeding, he would simply call the matter to the attention
of the "benchers" of the particular inn from which the barrister had
graduated, and they would make the necessary investigation. A barrister gets his business through solicitors and has no direct access to
his clients with the single exception of cases in which he is retained in
open court by a criminal in the dock. A solicitor on the other hand deals
with his client's every-day affairs, is an officer of the court, and is answerable to the court for his behavior. Many of his charges are rigidly prescribed by law. For instance, the charge is six shillings eight pence for
an interview and three shillings six pence for a letter. He may reach
the most prominent positions-Lloyd George was a solicitor-but as a
rule only the less important legal positions are open to him.
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Every now and then there is a movement to combine these two
branches either partially or entirely, as they are in this country, but,
strange as it may seem, a clear majority of each branch has always been
against any such combination. Each branch has its own halls, its own
associations, its own monopoly of paying business, own class spirit, and
the older men in each branch are pretty firmly set against making any
change.
Any little picture of English practice would be incomplete without
some description of the inns of court, which were the cradle of the
common law and which are still the gate of admission to the profession
of the barrister. To reach the inns one goes up Fleet Street-a typical
busy, noisy, big city street-past the Law Courts Building, which is a
big white stone structure five or six stories tall and which covers a very
large amount of ground. There is a huge main hall in this building,
numerous small branching halls, a restaurant, and court rooms everywhere, with the docket posted outside of each one. You see gowned and
be-wigged barristers, hurrying to their devisions, occasionally the redrobed figure of a judge, and witnesses and litigants by the hundreds. If
there is a notorious case in some particular court room, you will find it
impossible to get in unless you arrive before breakfast but ordinarily
there is plenty of room in the spectators' seats although their court rooms
are generally smaller than ours. On up Fleet Street one turns to the left
into Chancery Lane, and a few blocks up this narrow old-fashioned thoroughfare one reaches a park surrounded and scattered over by oldfashioned buildings-the inns of court. In the early days these inns
were the residences of the Knights Templar, who existed for the purpose of protecting Pilgrims to Jerusalem, and with the avowed intention
of renewing the crusades to take the Holy Land from the Saracens. They
grew enormously wealthy and had temples and shrines over England and
France; but a combination of church and state against them almost wiped
them out of existence. One De Molay was one of the Knight Templars
who was burned to death in France at this time. The Knights Hospitalers succeeded the Templars and in the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries
they leased the inns to a group of lawyers, probably the first group of
lawyers. But the place continued to have as turbulent a history as before. It was notoriously unsafe, and we are told in an earlier description that the beggars who used their crutches to lean on while they held
out their caps during the day, used the same crutches for clubs at night,
and most thoroughly robbed any stranger found alone in the neighborhood. An occasional watchman with a lantern or an occasional group
of lawyers traveling together were likely to be the sole pedestrians through
these lanes at night. In 1629 a royal messenger holding a warrant of ar-
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rest found his man in Lincoln Inn's Garden, but refrained from attempting to arrest him there out of respect for the place. After the messenger
had gone back into the street about thirty gentlemen of the inn, who felt
that his mere presence for such a purpose had been an insult to their privilege "fetched him into the house, violently pumped him, shaved him and
disgracefully used him." Francis Bacon lived and studied in the inns,
and so did Jeremy Bentham, Sir Philip Sydney, Thomas Moore, Edward
Burke and a host of other well-known legal and literary men. There
have been various inns in the past, but now they have been narrowed
down to four of the oldest ones: Lincoln's Inn, specializing in chancery
practice; the Inner Temple, generally accused of being the "high, brow"
school, and mostly made up of students of Oxford and Cambridge; the
Middle Temple, which is the most democratic of the inns; and Gray's Inn
which is the smallest but with a most imposing list of graduates. The
student who desires to be a barrister may take his law work at any of
the colleges or universities or trade schools in any part of the kingdom
which has a law department, but he must keep twelve terms at the inn
before he can join the profession. There are four terms a year of three
weeks each for a period of three years. These terms are called "dining
terms" and the students are literally required to dine together at their
inns during term times. The days are taken up with lectures by members of the law faculty and the evenings to getting acquainted with their
fellow aspirants. Of course, most of the study is carried on outside of
the term time, since the terms themselves cover only about twelve weeks
a year. It is possible for a man to attend one of the English universities
and at the same time "keep terms" at an inn. While he is "keeping terms"
no attendance is counted in his favor unless he be present at grace both
before and after meat, and it is possible that a man's table manner, or
his ability to get along with his fellow students, might be so bad that the
"benchers" would refuse to admit him to practice. But if he successfully
keeps his terms, and passes the rigid examinations connected therewith,
at the end of his course he repeats his pledge that he does not, and will
not, directly or indirectly, act in the capacity of a
"Solicitor, attorney at law, writer to the Signet, writer of the
Scots courts, proctor, notary public, clerk to chancery parliamentary
agent, agent in any court original or appellate, clerk to any
justice of the peace, registrar or high baliff of any court, officially
professed assistant or deputy receiver and liquidator in any bankruptcy or winding up act, chartered incorporated or professional
accountant, land agent, surveyor, patent agent, consulting engineer, clerk o any judge, barrister, conveyancor, special pleader or
equity draftsman, clerk of the peace or clerk to any officer in any
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court of justice, and that he is neither engaged in trade, nor an
undischarged bankrupt."
After having qualified himself in the opinion of the "benchers" and having purged himself of lesser ambitions by the pledge referred to, he becomes an utter barrister with a wig and gown and a right to practice if
the soliciors see fit to bring him the business.
The solicitor's preparation seems more exacting than that of the
barrister, but many students choose it in spite of that fact. The budding
solicitor must serve as a clerk for five years under a practicing solicitor.
This term is shortened for the graduate of certain accredited colleges,
but I understand that a very great number of the attending solicitors
spend the full five years practically as an apprentice. During his term as
a clerk he takes the required examinations at one of the law society
halls, which is his school and his parent in the profession, as an inn of
court is for the barrister. If successful, he is admitted and enrolled and
he takes out a certificate to practice. During the period of his clerkship
he pays the solicitor under whom he studies an agreed sum for his
tutelage. Two hundred and fifty pounds with the addition of a stamp
tax is about the sum he may expect to be charged. During his clerkship
he is not allowed to engage in any other employment, either in or out
of office hours, and he is not allowed to practice or act as solicitor in his
own right except with his employer's and the court's permission. The
penalty for violation of this rule is the loss of credit for so much of his
five years as have passed before the offense. A solicior's lot seems a
harder one than that of the barrister, although there are a great many
of what we would call "nice pieces of business" open to him which are
not open to the barrister; but he has the great advantage of not being
dependent upon another class of lawyers for his business, and free and
untrammeled relations with his clients. Progress in the legal profession
is much like it is in this country. The life is perhaps easier. It is quite
common for a lawyer to begin his week-end at Friday noon and not get
back to his office until eleven or twelve o'clock Monday morning. The
profession is more difficult to enter. A student can hardly make his
way for several years. The competition is perhaps not so keen, but
nevertheless the work is thoroughly and soundly done. As a matter of
fact, it seems to reach an almost machine-like exactness and correctness.
There is one form of promotion open to a barrister that is not present
in this country, and that is the grade K. C. or King's Counsel. A certain
per cent of the bar is raised to this rank by the High Court of Appeal,
at stated intervals. These men have certain rights of precedence and are
recognized as seniors by other barristers in all litigation. I saw about
twenty barristers made K. C's one morning in one of the court rooms in
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the Law Courts Building on Fleet Street. The men who had been selected sat in the back part of the room, in wigs and gowns, knee breeches
and silk stockings. As the judge on the bench called each man by name
he would come forward inside the inner railing and take the seat which
only a King's Counsel may occupy. As soon as he had taken his place
the judge would inquire: "Mr. Smith, do you move?" Whereupon, Mr.
Smith would arise, bow to the judge and to the assembled barristers in
all parts of the room and retire without speaking a word. Apparently,
the idea was that the court recognized Mr. Smith as having the right to
submit motions or proceed with pleadings from the seat of a King's
Counsel and from that time forward he was a King's Counsel. His gown
from that time on is made of silk instead of stuff, and therefore becoming
a King's Counsel is known as "taking the silk." Thereafter he cannot
accept a brief as junior to a barrister who is not a K. C. nor even as a
junior to a K. C. who has been appointed subsequently to himself. The
whole legal profession for that matter is organized like an army. A man
is always junior to those admitted before him.
After all the most surprising thing about English practice is that in
spite of the wigs and the gowns, and the barristers and solicitors, the
court procedure is almost identical with our own. You hear the same
objections, the statement of principles, and the same rulings in almost the
same words as you hear in the divisions of our circuit court. One thing
which surprised me was the comparatively enormous number of libel
and slander cases. It is quite a threat in England for one old lady to
say to another: "You will get a letter from my solicitor," meaning that
a slander or libel case is about to begin. Another surprise and a thing
which I wish we could obtain, is the apparent seriousness of jury service.
An Englishman seems to think it is an honor to serve on the jury. The
jurymen carry on their part of the trial with intense earnestness. For
some reason or other there is less litigation in England, in proportion to
the population, than in this country. It may be because the solicitor
who is handling a matter knows that a barrister, and not he, himself,
will get the lion's share of the fee if the case goes to trial; it may be because of the inherent respect for law inbred in the English people; it
may be because in England the loser pays the costs, which includes the
fee of the lawyer of the successful litigant; or it may be that the Englishman regards a law suit in the same light as he would a major surgical operation, as something in which he risks everything and not to be undertaken except in the most serious circumstances; or it may be for some
other reason. But it remains true that the litigation in our federal courts
alone is about as great in proportion to population as the total English
litigation except cases corresponding to our justice of the peace and police

LAW SERIES
court cases.

25,

MISSOURI BULLETIN

That is, our state court litigation represents about the sur-

plus of our litigation over that of the British Isles.
England has greatly simplified procedure and speeded up the administration of justice since Dickens wrote about Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, especially on the criminal side. For example, since 1915 the following would
be sufficient indictment in England, at common law:
The King vs. John Smith.
John Smith is charged with the following offense:
Statement of offense: murder.
Particulars of offense: John Smith did on the
19th day of October, 1920, in the County of Essex, murder Caroline Smith.
The Court of Criminal Appeal may review a criminal case either as
to conviction or sentence, and on any ground of law or fact it may
quash the conviction or shorten or lengthen the sentence. In fact, it
may do almost anything it pleases with the record, except to grant a
new trial.
Another distinguishing mark of the profession on the other side of
the water is easy to feel but hard to describe. There is a remarkable solidarity about it. Lawyers know each other, mix with all in the profession, visit together, think together, and act together. This is partly due
to the fact that all the barristers pass through the inns of court and
all the solicitors through the law societies halls and are therefore in a
sense fellow alumni. But it is probably due much more to comparative
smallness, both numerical and geographical. An English lawyer is likely
to be startled by the idea that a lawyer in Missouri probably never gets
in the same court room with a lawyer from California and that they
probably never act together in any enterprise unless they both happen to
attend the American Bar Association. Short distances have caused the
gathering of the great bulk of the business in London and all of the
barristers have tried cases in the same building on Fleet Street. When
a layman wants legal advice it is about as easy for him to run down to
London as it would be to go to any other town. As a result, out of a
recent law list of about ten thousand barristers only three hundred and
sixty-three were entered as of the provincial bar and fully a third of all
the solicitors live in London. So, a sort of close knit fraternity is developed within the profession which must go far toward recompensing
the members for the limitations under which they labor.
I realize that though I may have given some idea of the limitations
of an English lawyer, I have failed wholly to give an adequate picture of his good points, or of the attractive side of his life and his pro-
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fession. I found him to be human and cordial, almost always a student,
and at the same time a man of considerable leisure. When everybody
takes two or two and one-half days for a week end, no one seems to
lose his business by it. He spends many of these week ends on the river
or in the country, or up in Scotland, and he keeps in touch with his
friends and sees them often. Though, as a class, he may be somewhat
slow and antiquated he is also sound, thorough and reliable. As our
former ambassador to Great Britain has said:
"He is in very truth our brother. For the common law
by which we live has its roots in English soil. The judges who
interpret it on both sides of the water look to their distant colleagues for counsel and assistance, and the principles of liberty
which it embodies are the rod and staff by which our peoples
walk. Trained in the same school, professing the same great
ideals, sharers of like obligations, immunities and privileges,
there rests upon the legal profession in England and America
a duty which is joint and not several, common and not divisible."
As members of a profession I take it we are interested, over and
above the practical ways for settling this and that client's immediate problems, in the spirit and philosophy and development of the law. I am
far from suggesting the English practice as a pattern for us. I can
hardly imagine an American lawyer, or American clients for that matter, submitting to the limitations resulting from the division of the profession into barristers and solicitors, for instance. But sometimes it does
us good to get out of ourselves and consider what other bodies of lawyers have done with much the same problems. The British Bar works
under different conditions but with the same common law and largely
the same purposes and ideals . An occasional examination of their methods and reforms, successes and failures, may well be of value to us in
slow but steady development of the truth that, "wisdom is better than
weapons of war."'
Kansas City, Missouri

FRANK

E.

TYLER

1. After the armistice, Mr. Tyler, then a captain of infantry in the A.
E. F., spent four months as a student in Lincoln's Inn.-Ed.
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CERTIORARI IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
The article of Judge W. W. Graves, one of the Judges of the Missouri Supreme Court, appearing in Bar Bulletin, Law Series 24, is a
most lucid and interesting resumg of this subject. From the standpoint
of some of the practitioners, the change of front on the part of the court
on the great question, did not accur too soon or too late. For years
it was clear to many that the constitutional amendment of 1884, creating
the Kansas City Court of Appeals and authorizing the legislature to
create another, when need be, meant to place the duty on the Supreme
Court of having the final determination of whether a decision of one
of the Courts of Appeals was or was not, on a given point, harmonious
with the holdings of other Courts of Appeals and with those of the Supreme Court.
It is well said by Judge Graves that one of the main objects of the
amendment was "to keep these Court of Appeals in accord with each
other in their decisions, and with the rulings of this court." (Law Series
Bulletin 24, p. 6). It is stated more fully, and probably better, in Judge
Graves' concurring opinion in State ex rel v. Robertson (264 Mo. 1. c.
672) :
"When the Constitution (both the original and the amended) is read as a whole, it is clear that the framers contemplated
a judicial system, with one Supreme Court, at the head of that
system. It is clear that they contemplated that as to all doctrines
of both law and equity there should be one final arbiter, and that
arbiter the body which they chose to designate as the Supreme
Court. It was never contemplated that one doctrine of law or
equity should apply in certain appellate jurisdictions, and another
and different doctrine in other appellate jurisdictions. Throughout he entire document (both the original and amended) runs
the idea of harmony in the law. Not only so, but with this idea
is the further one, that there has been vested in the Supreme
Court the power to enforce harmony of decision, in so far as they
touch upon doctrines of law or equity. * * * Judges, like individuals, honestly differ and give different constructions to the same
language at times, and discrepancies in announced doctrines will
creep in unless there is a power (at the head) somewhere to act
as final arbiter." (Italics supplied.)
Therefore, does it not necessarily and logically follow that, whether
such conflict of doctrine arises between a decision of a Court of Appeals
and one of the Supreme Court or between one Court of Appeals and another, in either case, the province and duty devolves upon the "final ar-

BAR BULLETIN

biter" to exercise its superintending control, when duly applied for? Of
the many instances of the grant of this writ by the Supreme Court, none
has been grounded solely on a conflict of decision between two Courts
of Appeals. True, it is incumbent upon any Court of Appeals, when it
finds itself opposed to the doctrine held on the subject by another Court
of Appeals, to; certify the cause to the Supreme Court for determination.
But does not certiorari, as used by the Supreme Court, leave it in such
case to the Court of Appeals to decide, whether there is such a conflict,
instead of that question being determined by the "final arbiter"? If
perchance the Court of Appeals holds there is no such diversity of opinion
between itself and another Court of Appeals, is not the defeated party
thereby concluded, and without remedy by certiorari?
It would seem that Rule 34, which Judge Graves says in his article
(p. 16) "applies specifically to applications for the writ of certiorari,"
assumes that conflict with some Supreme Court decision is the only ground
contemplated as a basis for the writ. It says: "No writ of certiorari shall
be granted to quash the judgment of a Court of Appeals on the ground
that such court has failed or refused to follow the last controlling decision of the Supreme Court, unless" etc. Then, how about cases, if any.
where the precise question has not been decided by the Supreme Court?
What becomes, in such instances, of the case of contrariety of opinion
only between two Courts of Appeal? What becomes of the doctrine
that the Constitution never contemplated that there should be one rule of
law prevalent in one appellate jurisdiction and a contrary rule in another?
The rule does not recognize that there is or can be any writ of the sort
granted, except for the one reason of the challenged opinion being in
conflict with "a controlling decision of the Supreme Court." Practically,
a vast majority of applications are denied by the court, and it must be
assumed that they should be. It is worthy of reflection, however, that
the reason for the Supreme Court's ruling in any case only appears, when
the preliminary writ is actually granted and the case formally decided.
In all others the parties and their counsel are left in total darkness as
to the reason for the ruling.
It would seem that it should not be assumed and conclusively presumed by the rule that necessarily and in all possible cases, the Supreme
Court has had prior occasion to rule specifically on the precise question
involved. Certain it is, as has been said, in no published utterances of
the Supreme Court has the writ been awarded on the ground that the
decisicn of one Court of Appeals was contrary to that of another. Many
are the instances where on closer examination the Supreme Court has
quashed its own writ instead of quashing the attacked opinion of the
Court of Appeals, and this for the rightly held reason that the challenged
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opinion was not in conflict, as claimed, with the specified opinion or opinions of the Court of last resort. Hence, these remarks are submitted.
Kansas City, Missouri.

R. A. BALL.

ADMISSION TO THE BAR-The American public has been far
too prone to regard the practice of law as a privilege which should be
open to any bright, ambitious young chap, rather than an official appointment on behalf of the state to those who from the state's point of view
can best promote this branch of government.-Theodore Francis Greene,
Vol. VIII Am. Bar. Assoc. Journal, page 421.

NATURE OF PRESUMPTION.-In construing circumstantial or
presumptive evidence in respect to the corpus delicti, we should proceed
upon the theory that defendant is presumed to be innocent, and that this
presumption follows him, until the case is finally disposed of in court.
-Railey, C., in State v. Bowman (1922) 243 S. W. I. c. 117.
It is true, as held in Crook v. Tull, 111 Mo. 283, 20 S. W. 8, the law
creates a presumption that property purchased by the wife during coverture was paid for with the husband's money. But this is only a presumption, and such presumption disappears on the appearance of positive
testimony as in the case at bar that the property was purchased by the
wife with her own funds and accumulated earnings.-Arnold, J., in Shepard v. People's Storage & Transfer Co. (1922) 243 S. W. 196.
But I do insist that such a presumption (i. e. against suicide) cannot exist in the presence of evidence diametrically contradicting it. And
it cannot make any difference whether the evidence which contradicts and
refutes the bare presumption is direct or circumstantial. The moment
explanatory evidence comes into the case the presumption dissolves into
thin air and becomes as wholly non-existent as though it never had had
existence.-Faris, J., dissenting in Reynolds v. Casualty Co. (1917) 274
Mo. 1. c. 107.
In a criminal case the burden is on the state to convince of the
existence of the essential ingredients of the particular crime. This burden does not shift. Consequently, it is unnecessary to state that a presumption of innocence is with the defendant throughout the trial. It is
sufficient to say that the burden of convincing remains with the state.
In this way, it is believed, the attitude of the court in State v. Bowman may be reconciled with the other two declarations.
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ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.-Dependence upon action of
Congress to effect reform to remove delays and to bring about speed in
the administration of justice has not brought the best results, and some
different mode should be tried. The failures of justice in this country,
especially in the state courts, have been more largely due to the withholding of power from judges over proceedings before them than to
any other cause; and yet judges have to bear the brunt of the criticism
which is so general as to the results of present court action. The judges
should be given the power commensurate with their responsibility. Their
capacity to reform matters should be tried to see whether better results
may not be attained. Federal judges doubtless have their faults, but
they are not chiefly responsible for the present defect in the administration of justice in the Federal Courts. Let Congress give them an opportunity to show what can be done by vesting in them sufficient discretion for the purpose.-Mr. Chief Justice Taft before American Bar Association.

Resolution of American Bar Association
WHEREAS, one of the gravest duties confronting the judges and
lawyers of America is an administration of justice that will command the
respect and veneration of the people:
RESOLVED,-First: that Congress be and it is hereby respectfully
petitioned to provide by suitable statutory law for the creation of a
Commission, the personnel of which shall be appointed by the President
and to be composed of two Justices of the Supreme Court, two Circuit
Judges, two District Judges and three members of the Bar of high standing and qualified by learning and experience.
Such Commission shall prepare and recommend to Congress amendments to the present statutes and the Judicial Code, authorizing a unit
administration of law and equity in one form of civil action.
Second: That such act shall provide for a permanent Commission,
created in similar manner, with power to prepare a system of rules of
procedure for adoption by the Supreme Court, with power to amend
from time to time.
Such rules and their amendment, after approval by the Supreme
Court, shall be submitted to Congress for its action and shall become
effective in six months after such submission, if Congress shall take no
action thereon.
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COMMITTEE
ON AMENDMENTS, JUDICIARY, AND PROCEDURE:
Chairman Francis M. Curlee, St. Louis; Robert F. Walker, Jefferson City; Henry L.
McCune, Kansas City; Boyle G. Clark, Columbia; Robert L. Ward, Caruthersville.
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR:
Chairman, J. J. Vineyard, Kansas City; Christy M. Farrar, St. Louis; Forrest C.
Donnell, St. Louis; Lee Montgomery, Sedalia; E. D. Ellison, Kansas City.
COMMITTEE ON BAR ASSOCIATIONS:
Chairman, J. Hugo Grimm, St.
Louis. Maurice H. Winger, Kansas City; J. D. Hostetter, Bowling Green; George
H. Hubbell, Trenton; Ernest A. Green, St. Louis.
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL PUBLICATIONS: Chairman, George H. English,
Jr., Kansas City; Robert B. Fizzell, Kansas City; L. C. Lozier, Carrollton; Frank
E. Tyler, Kansas City; Kenneth C. Sears, Columbia.
COMMITTEE ON GRIEVANCES AND LEGAL ETHICS: Chairman, Allen
McReynolds, Carthage; William S. Bedal, St. Louis; R. B. Caldwell, Kansas City;
M. D. Campbell, Kirksville; R. B. Oliver, Jr., Cape Girardeau.
COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS: Chairman, Clifford Histed,
Kansas City; James C. Jones, St. Louis; H. M. Langworthy, Kansas City; Elmer
0. Jones, La Plata.
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL BIOGRAPHY: Chairman, Henry Lamm, Sedalia;
W. W. Graves, Jefferson City; 0. H. Dean, Kansas City; Wash Adams, Kansas
City; Vinton Pike, St. Joseph.
COMMITTEE ON THE ILLEGAL PRACTICE OF LAW BY LAYMEN:
Chairman, Harris E. Sprague, St. Louis; J. Ir. Hull, Platte City; R. E. Ball, Kansas City, S. W. Bates, Webb City; J. P. Swaim, Mountain View.
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL CANDIDATES: Chairman, Glendy B. Arnold,
St. Louis; A. E. Spencer, Joplin; R. F. Lozier, Carrollton; N. T. Cave, Fulton;
A. T. Dumm, Jefferson City; J. N. Blayney, St. Louis; -Ingraham D. Hook, Kansas
City; Perry Post Taylor, St. Louis.

